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Manifestos and public opinion: a new test of the classic Downsian spatial 
model 
 
 
Abstract. According to the Downs spatial model of electoral competition, in bipartisan 
systems political parties’ manifestos are closer to the median voter’s concerns, while in 
multiparty democracies partisan concerns are more covered in parties’ platforms. Based on 
data in political manifestos and public opinion in 23 European countries from 2004 to 2012, 
we show that the Downsian model provides correct predictions. Two more specific points are 
uncovered in this article: first, unlike the previous studies and the original model, we focus on 
the people’s most important issue, instead of on their preferences. Second, we analyse seven 
different issues, and we show that the Downsian model works only on the issues which reflect 
the left-right continuum.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Building on Hotelling’s seminal paper, Downs (1957) developed a model whose aim is to 
predict the behaviour of candidates in a two party electoral competition, under the 
assumptions of a one-dimensional political space, rational and self interested voters and 
election seeking candidates.  
One of the core predictions of the model is that parties in a two-party system change their 
platforms so that they reflect the median voter preference; whereas parties in a multi-party 
system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible (see also Cox 1990). 
Indeed, on the one hand, two main parties or candidates have an incentive to converge toward 
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the position of the median voter, because this position is the only one which cannot be 
defeated in the context of a bipartisan competition. On the other hand, in multi-party systems, 
the party which gets close to the median preference would lose votes on its previous 
ideological ground because of a more extreme party’s strategic choice to converge a little to 
the centre too.  
In two party systems, political platforms accurately display the median voter’s preference 
only under the strong assumption of full inelasticity of voter preference. In other words, 
citizens vote for the closest party whatever the ideological distance between their preference 
and that of this party. If citizens decide to not vote when the distance is too far, the spatial 
model concludes that the party platform ceases to approach the centre when in order to win a 
centrist voter it has to lose two extremist voters. Under this more reasonable assumption, in 
two party systems, each party is located somewhere between the median voter’s ideology and 
the right-wing or left-wing mean voter preference. In multi-party systems, this dilemma does 
not exist; each party is located on specific partisan ground1.  
This paper tests this Downsian statement based on data from political manifestos in 23 
European countries between 2004 and 2012. Political manifestos are more appropriate than 
public policies to test the spatial model for two reasons. First, manifestos are more 
manipulable, i.e.: it is easier to adjust platforms than policies in response to changes in public 
opinion. Second, manifestos are equally available for each citizen at the national level, 
whereas policies can concern specific interest groups because there are more of them and they 
are less visible. This choice is far from new: an abundant literature has already tested the 
spatial model with political manifestos.  
The most original empirical feature of this paper consists in using party or citizens’ concerns 
instead of preferences. Concerns are measured with “the two most important problems” 
                                                 
1
 A formal model is provided by Plümper and Martin (2008).  
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(MIPs) facing the nation. Despite criticism towards empirical and conceptual property of this 
measure (Wlezien 2005), this strategy has two advantages. First, data allow us to test our 
hypotheses on several political issues rather than exclusively rely on a global placement on 
the left-right scale, used in previous studies on this topic. Second, it allows us to weaken 
another strong assumption of the spatial model that citizens have a preference about what 
policies should be decided. With our design, we just assume that citizens have an opinion 
about the most important issue, without necessarily knowing how to solve it.  
Note, however, that the importance of the problem is not always associated with the left-right 
preferences. For example, the economy is generally deemed as a relevant problem by all, even 
though there are partisan disagreements about the policies which should be undertaken. In 
contrast, other problems, such as criminality or environment, are more important for people 
who place themselves, respectively, on the right or on the left of the political spectrum. This 
study, therefore, shows that when the problem importance is distributed along the left-right 
one-dimensional space, the Downsian prediction prove to be correct.  
The next section deals with the empirical literature on the Downs’ hypothesis. Then we 
present our data and hypotheses. The fourth section presents the result, before concluding.  
 
Background 
There is overall little evidence for a general convergence of parties' positions in two party 
systems: some studies even show that political parties tend to adopt more extreme positions 
than their own electorate (for a review, see Iversen 1994). In particular, a large literature has 
provided evidence for a party polarization in the US, which is among the most typical case of 
two-party system (Theriault 2006). The most common explanation lies in the too strict 
assumptions underlying Downs' model (Stokes 1963; Grofman 2004). However, empirical 
studies show that parties adjust their policy positions in response to factors identified by the 
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spatial theory, such as shifts of the median voter's and rival parties' positions or past election 
results, even in the context of multiparty elections (for a review, see Adams 2012). Wagner 
(2012) finds that the largest parties respond to shifts in the opinion of the median voter, 
whereas smaller parties are rather responsive to the preferences of their own voters (see also 
Adams et al. 2004, Ezrow et al. 2011).   
Building on Cox (1990) some empirical studies analyze the impact of institutional factors on 
the validity of the predictions derived from the spatial theory. Most of these studies focus on 
the comparative effect of PR and plurality or majority systems and analyze either the direct 
impact of electoral laws or their indirect effects (through the party system). However, the 
results are mostly contradictory. Dow (2001, 2011) compares the degree of convergence of 
parties' positions in majority and proportional systems, and finds that parties and candidates 
are located closer to the median voter in majority systems which are, according to Duverger’s 
law, generally two-party systems. By contrast, Ezrow (2008) shows that the true number of 
parties has no effect on the party system's dispersion, and that proportional settings do not 
necessarily induce stronger centrifugal incentives for political parties. Moreover, contrary to 
the predictions of the spatial theory, parties represent the mean voter in proportional systems 
but not in disproportional systems (Ezrow 2011; see also Ezrow et al. 2011). Calvo and 
Hellwig (2011) find that electoral rules have different impacts on large and small parties: as 
proportionality decreases, large parties tend to converge toward the centre of the political 
spectrum, whereas small parties radicalize their ideological positions and move away from the 
median voter. Andrews and Money (2009) show that only the number of parties in the system 
is relevant to predict the ideological convergence or divergence of parties’ positions. By 
contrast, Matakos and his colleagues (2013) find that both the electoral system and the 
number of parties affect the ideological distance between parties. 
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All in all, empirical literature about the Downsian hypothesis based on party manifestos tends 
to be centred on the effect of the number of parties, the difference between mainstream and 
minor parties and the electoral system. In this study we focus only on the number of parties 
and their size. As previously stated, we also analyze the Downsian prediction across different 
issues.  
 
Hypotheses and data 
1. Hypotheses 
The core hypotheses of this article are that (H1) Public opinion influences the content of 
political manifestos and (H2) the number and the size of parties impacts the way in which the 
public opinion influences political manifestos. These general hypotheses include three 
expectations: 
Ex1. In multiparty systems, manifestos reflect the partisan public opinion, that means that 
right-wing parties’ manifestos and left wing parties’ manifestos are respectively influenced by 
right-wing and left-wing public opinion.  
Ex2. In two-party systems, mainstream party’s manifestos reflect median public opinion 
Ex3. In two-party systems, small parties’ manifestos reflect partisan public opinion 
The second expectation could be more or less true, according to the degree of elasticity of 
voters’ preferences, as we noted above. The third deals with the problem that there are no 
pure two-party systems, but only systems approaching it.   
 
 
2. Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset 
Our data are based on the Eurobarometer survey and on the CMP data in 23 European 
countries and over 9 years during which 48 elections occurred (data are detailed in the 
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appendix). For each election, 345 party manifestos are taken into account, on average around 
7 per election. The CMP dataset reports the total number of (quasi-)sentences in a party 
manifesto for several specific issue areas. Thus, we compute the attention given by each 
manifesto to 7 issues: Foreign Policy, the Economy, Environment, Healthcare and pensions, 
Education, Crime, and Immigration, which well suit the problems cited by the Eurobarometer 
survey2. Table 1 shows the average attention that each issue takes in the European manifestos. 
Note that the Economy is widely the most cited issue in manifestos whereas immigration is 
the least cited.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3. Eurobarometer surveys 
Since 2003, the standard Eurobarometer surveys ask respondents which issues they regard as 
the most important ones facing their own country. Respondents have to pick out two answers 
among a list of fourteen issues3. We select the issues which match those of the CMP: 
economy (including economic situation, crime, inflation, taxation, and unemployment), crime, 
                                                 
2
 On the Manifestos database, some of them are easily traceable: Environment is coded par501 (Environmental 
Protection); Crime: per605 (Law and Order); Education: per506 (Education Expansion); and per507 (Education 
Limitation); Immigration: 607 and 608 (Multiculturalism positive and negative). Healthcare and pensions are 
gathered in the general categories 504 and 505 (Welfare State Expansion and Limitation). Foreign Policy 
includes all codes in Domain 1 (External Relations), except those about the European Union (per108 and 
per110). Finally, the Economy includes per401 (Free enterprise), per402 (Incentives), per403 (Market 
regulation), per404 (Economic planning), per406 and per407 (protectionism positive and negative), per408 
(economic goals), per409 (Keynesian Demand Management), per410 (productivity), per412 (Controlled 
economy), and per413 (Nationalization). 
3
 The list includes the following issues : economic situation, crime, inflation, taxation, unemployment , terrorism, 
foreign affairs, housing, immigration, healthcare system, educational system, pensions, environment, energy.  
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environment, immigration, healthcare and pensions, education and foreign affairs) and 
identify for each of them, the percentage of respondents who regard them as important.  
Then we collect public concerns declared from between 6 months and 1 year before each 
election4. This time lag allows us to be sure that manifestos are an effect and not a cause of 
the public opinion changes. For each issue, we obtain the priorities of the median voter, which 
correspond to the concerns of median voter on the left-right scale. Note that response 5 
includes the median voter in almost all countries in the sample, except Denmark (2007), 
Ireland (2007) and Romania (2008) in which the median voter gives the response 6. Also, we 
collect the priorities of left-wing voters (respondents placing themselves between 1 and 4 on 
the left-right scale) and right-wing (6-10 and 7-10 for the three cases mentioned above) voters 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 reveals that for almost all issues, the percentage of attention in the category including 
the median voter along the left-right continuum is situated between the percentages of left-
wing and right-wing voters. Only education does not display this pattern. Distinguishing the 
issues, therefore, allows us to expect specific results according to the issues considered. More 
accurately: 
Ex.4 The hypotheses tested are less valid about education than about the other issues, and 
more valid about the issues in which the distance between left and right is large (environment, 
crime and immigration).  
                                                 
4
 In some cases, we collected data on public opinion only four months before the election (Spain, 2004; Poland, 
2007; Denmark, 2005; Portugal, 2005) because the desirable slot was not available. 
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In order to test the impact of partisan voters on manifestos, a specific variable is needed which 
matches the opinion of left-wing voters to the left-wing parties and the opinion of right-wing 
voters to the right-wing parties. To identify the ideological position of each party on the left-
right scale, we use non-expert surveys provided by the European Election surveys. They ask 
respondents to place each political party on the left-right scale in 2004 and 2009. The closest 
date is used to assess whether each party is situated on the median, on the left or on the right 
of the left-right scale. This informs us which part of the public should influence which party 
manifesto5.  
 
4. Effective number and size of parties 
Finally, to distinguish the two-party systems from the others, the effective number of parties 
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979) is computed for the period which precedes the election. Three 
groups are distinguished: elections with fewer than 2.9 parties (two party systems), elections 
with 2.9 to 4.9 effective parties, and the elections with more than 4.9 parties. Generally, each 
country belongs to the same category, regardless of the election. However, Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Portugal, Slovakia and the Netherlands switch categorization across elections 
(detailed data are provided in the appendix).  
The percentage of seats for each party is also computed, in order to distinguish mainstream 
parties (over 30%) and other parties (less than 30%).  
 
 
Results.  
1. Effective number of parties, median and partisan preference 
                                                 
5
 Note that with this method, 13 small parties about which we have no information are lost.  
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The two estimations gather all issues together in a pooled panel linear regression. The 
dependent variable is the place given to each issue by each party, before a given election. 
Since we do not have invariant explanatory variables and since the model with random effects 
necessitates stronger assumptions about the relationship between the error terms and the 
nation effects, we prefer to carry out country and year fixed effect estimates. And even though 
the seven issues considered capture only 46% of the content of each manifesto, we can 
suppose that the attention given to each issue is not totally independent from the others. This 
is why the variance of errors is corrected with the cluster method at the manifesto level.  
Table 3 shows four estimates: model A analyzes the whole sample. Model B selects only 
elections in two-party system context. Model C selects moderate multi-party systems (2.9 to 
4.9 parties), and model C analyzes extreme multi-party systems (more than 4.9).  
Each model is double. The first column shows the effect of both median and partisan public 
opinion on political manifestos. However, both input variables are strongly correlated. The 
second column shows the estimates when the difference “partisan opinion minus median 
opinion” (hereafter PMM) is used as an independent variable to capture the relative effect of 
median and partisan opinion without collinearity problems. When PMM is positive, 
manifestos resemble partisan opinion more than median opinion. When PMM is negative, 
median opinion is more influential. Finally, when PMM is not significant, the party does not 
prefer one to the other.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Models A and A’ show that partisan public opinion clearly influences political manifestos 
more than the median public opinion. However, in two-party systems (model B) the impact of 
partisan public opinion ceases to be significant. In moderate multi-party systems (model C), 
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the coefficient of the partisan public opinion and of PMM are significant and their magnitude 
is comparable to those in model A. Finally, in highly fragmented party systems the impact of 
partisan public opinion is particularly strong, and the PMM coefficient confirms that parties 
clearly choose to represent their own electorate rather than the median voter.   
These results confirm expectation 1 and provide clues for expectations 2 and 3. According to 
model B, it is difficult to say whether in two party systems the manifestos reflect both median 
and partisan public opinion or if public opinion does not impact manifestos at all. The first 
interpretation, however, is more likely because both median and partisan opinions are highly 
predictive of manifesto content when each of them is an isolated input (respectively R2 equals 
.30 and .32). However, to test expectations 2 and 3 the size of the party has to be taken into 
account. 
 
2. Size of parties 
The model shown in table 4 exclusively uses PMM as explanatory variable, and interacts it 
with the size of the party. Estimations are run for two party, moderate multiparty and extreme 
multiparty systems. 
  
Table 4 about here 
 
Results show that in multiparty systems, the party manifestos clearly follow the partisan 
public opinion, and there is no significant difference between mainstream parties and other 
parties. This pattern is more pronounced in extreme multiparty systems.  
In two party systems, mainstream parties follow the median public opinion (the PMM 
coefficient is negative) and the other parties do not seem so attracted by partisan opinions. So, 
expectation 2 is confirmed, but not expectation 3. This result globally confirms the Downsian 
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hypothesis: bipartisan systems provide centripetal incentives for mainstream political parties, 
whereas multiparty systems do not. More surprisingly, non-mainstream parties tend to be less 
partisan when the number of parties is low.  
 
3. Issue by issue 
This section aims to verify whether the same results are observed for each issue or for issues 
in which the difference between left-wing and right-wing public opinion is meaningful. Now 
the panel is not pooled anymore, and the estimates are similar, but the errors are clustered at 
the country level.  
To maximize information, we use only the PMM input interacted with the effective number of 
parties in each country before a given election. We also use two control variables: the size of 
the party (measured by each party’s number of seats in the parliament) and the effective 
number of parties (which could have an impact on the dependent variable within each specific 
category).  
Dummy variables for years and countries are not shown, but they can also give useful 
information about the attention voters pay to each issue.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows that the pattern found in the previous section – with the partisan opinion 
impact growing with the effective number of parties – is found, as expected, for the three 
issues in which public opinion is the most polarized: education, crime and immigration.  
About the environment, the partisan impact is particularly strong. The number of seats also 
has a negative impact, which means that this issue is overrepresented in small parties’ 
manifestos (like green parties, which are generally left-wing). Also, there is no special trend 
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for this issue, which is more discussed in Scandinavian countries and Estonia than in other 
countries.  
Crime is also a partisan value in multi-party systems. Unlike the environment, however, it is 
discussed in the majority parties’ manifestos. This effect is particularly informative for the 
Downsian hypothesis because it means that the importance given to crime in multi-party 
systems is not only due to the presence of niche parties in those systems. Mainstream parties 
are partisan in multi-party systems and they are more interested in median-voter concerns in 
two-party systems. Note that crime is more discussed in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Italy and 
the Netherlands.  
Finally, the importance given to immigration does not depend on the party’s number of seats 
and its importance decreases over time. This issue is more debated in western and rich 
countries, particularly in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands.  
Contrary to what was expected, there is no partisan effect on the economy and foreign policy. 
A slight effect is observed for the healthcare and pension problem. As expected, for education 
no significant impact is observed. The mention of the economy in manifestos is essentially 
predicted by the year: after the 2008 crisis its place grows. Foreign policy is most debated in 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, while the importance of education declines over 
time. For healthcare and pensions, there is a partisan effect in extreme multiparty systems, and 
no notable effect per year or per country.  
All in all, when left-wing parties and right-wing parties are polarized on a specific issue – 
such as the environment, crime and immigration – the political manifestos reflect this 
polarization as the system is multi-partisan, while they tend to stay slightly closer to the 
median concerns when the system is bipartisan.  
 
Conclusion 
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Overall, in two-party systems, mainstream parties tend to follow the median public opinion, 
while the other political parties do not clearly choose to represent the median voter rather than 
the priorities of their own electorate. 
In multiparty systems, left-wing and right-wing parties tend to represent respectively left-
wing or right-wing voters rather than the median voter.  
These findings are confirmed in issues in which there is a relative polarization within public 
opinion – such as environment, crime and immigration – while when issues are not clearly 
polarized in a linear two-dimension space, the Downsian prediction is not observed. 
These results are consistent with those from previous studies testing the spatial theory of 
elections (Dow 2001, 2010; Andrews & Money 2009; Calvo & Hellwig 2011; Matakos et al. 
2013). The only exception is Ezrow's article (2008), which shows no evidence that 
multipartism promotes more extreme party positioning.  
In addition to these findings, our analysis allows new specifications. First, political parties 
react to the most important problems for public opinion in a Downsian way. Previous studies 
are based on parties and opinion preferences. This article focuses on public attention and 
shows that, as this attention varies according to the placement on the left-right political space, 
the number and the size of parties influence the way in which public opinion impacts on party 
manifestos.   
Second, since our analysis is based on specific issues, it contributes to better understand 
which incentives parties have to talk about one problem instead to another. The relative 
attention given by each party for each problem partly depends on which part of the electorate 
is concerned for, and on how many other parties run for the parliament.  
Finally, the findings only regard European countries and contradict what it has been observed 
in the Unites States. In this specific two-party system, the main political parties tend to 
polarize since at least ten years. Of course, it could simply be an outlier. However, unlike the 
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European party systems, the US is based on two types of elections: primary and general. Even 
though it is officially a two-party systems, some parties, such as the Tea Party, chose to run at 
the stage of primary elections. This makes the US situation quite unclear (Rasmussen and 
Schoen). That is why, quite surprisingly, Europe is a useful piece of evidence for testing the 
Downs hypothesis.  
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Table 1. Percentage of attention in political manifestos to the following policy domains 
(2004-2012) :  
 
 Mean Standard Error N 
Foreign Policy 4.50 0.17 345 
Economy 14.22 0.39 345 
Environment 5.57 0.35 345 
Healthcare and pensions 9.72 0.28 345 
Education 5.35 0.20 345 
Crime 4.33 0.21 345 
Immigration 1.85 0.17 345 
Total 8.75 0.14 3795 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of attention in public opinion to the following policy domains (2003-
2011). SE are in parentheses.  
 
 Median Left Right 
Foreign Policy 1.96 (0.16) 2.05 (0.16) 1.92 (0.08) 
Economy 74.59 (0.91) 75.51 (0.92) 73.43 (0.95) 
Environment 4.05 (0.27) 5.88 (0.39) 3.83 (0.20) 
Healthcare and pensions 26.25 (0.68) 27.43 (0.73) 26.21 (0.65) 
Education 5.63 (0.27) 7.53 (0.33) 6.36 (0.23) 
Crime 23.27 (0.61) 19.67 (0.55) 23.59 (0.61) 
Immigration 10.65 (0.54) 9.12 (0.46) 13.32 (0.64) 
 
 
Table 3. Estimations of attention paid to all issues in political manifestos (split samples 
according to the effective number of parties) 
 
 A A’ B B’ C C’ D D’ 
Partisan   0.21** 
(0.03) 
 0.11 
(0.07) 
 0.19** 
(0.04) 
 0.45** 
(0.07) 
 
Median -0.08* 
(0.03) 
 0.00 
(0.07) 
 -0.04 
(0.04) 
 -0.31** 
(0.07) 
 
Partisan-Median  0.14** 
(0.04) 
 0.07 
(0.09) 
 0.10* 
(0.05) 
 0.36** 
(0.08) 
Constant 3.16** 
(0.41) 
6.23** 
(0.38) 
1.41 
(1.53) 
3.39 
(1.83) 
2.29** 
(0.36) 
5.70** 
(0.30) 
5.43** 
(0.84) 
8.35** 
(0.80) 
 
N 2324 2324 532 532 1210 1210 582 582 
R2 0.34 0.03 0.33 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.35 0.06 
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
Country and year fixed effects included. SE (in parentheses) are adjusted for 84 clusters in 
manifestos.  
A includes all country-years. B includes situations with fewer than 3 effective parties. C 
includes situations in which there are between 3 to 5 effective parties. D includes situations 
with more than 5 effective parties.  
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Table 4. Estimations of attention paid to all issues in political manifestos (split samples 
according to the effective number of parties and interaction with seats) 
 
 Two Party 
System (B) 
Moderate 
Multi Party 
System (C) 
Extreme Multi Party 
System (D) 
Partisan-Median  0.18 
(0.11) 
0.12* 
(0.05) 
0.39** 
(0.08) 
(Partisan-Median)*more than 
30% of seats  
-0.33* 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.58 
(0.38) 
Constant 1.69 
(2.07) 
5.73** 
(0.30) 
7.96** 
(0.85) 
 
N 532 1210 582 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.06 
** p<0.05 * p<0.01 
Country and year fixed effects included. SE (in parentheses) are adjusted for 84 clusters in 
manifestos. B includes situations with less than 3 effective parties. C includes situations in 
which there are between 3 to 5 effective parties. D includes situations with more than 5 
effective parties. 
 
 
Table 5. Estimations of attention paid to each issue in political manifestos 
 
 Foreign 
Policy 
Economy Environme
nt 
Healthcare 
and 
pensions 
Education Crime Immigration 
(Partisan-
Median)*less 
than 3 parties 
0.22 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.26) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
-0.09 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
(Partisan-
Median)*3-5 
parties 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.19) 
0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.23  
(0.21) 
0.21** 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
(Partisan-
Median)*more 
than 5 parties 
0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
1.26** 
(0.35) 
0.22* 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
0.43** 
(0.11) 
0.31** 
(0.07) 
Number of parties 0.25 
(0.60) 
0.76 
(1.04) 
-2.18** 
(0.68) 
0.59 
(1.17) 
0.21 
(0.47) 
0.00 
(0.39) 
-0.41 
(0.29) 
% of seats -0.75 
(1.85) 
3.32 
(3.06) 
-8.16** 
(2.30) 
3.76 
(1.80) 
2.40 
(1.89) 
4.56* 
(1.90) 
-1.28 
(0.89) 
Constant 4.27* 
(1.84) 
5.45 
(3.07) 
13.22** 
(2.39) 
5.24 
(3.98) 
4.23* 
(1.55) 
5.68** 
(1.49) 
5.93** 
(0.85) 
 
N 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 
R2 0.25 0.37 0.23 0.44 0.33 0.45 0.32 
Country and year fixed effects included. SE (in parentheses) are adjusted for 84 clusters in 
countries.  
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 
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Appendix I : Countries, elections and effective number of parties (2004-2012) 
Country Parliamentary election month 
Effective number of parties 
(before the election) 
Austria 200809 3.38 
  200610 2.88 
Belgium 201007 9.03 
  200706 7.03 
Bulgaria 200907 4.8 
  200506 2.92 
Croatia 201112 3.08 
  200711 3.55 
Czech Republic 201005 3.1 
  200606 3.67 
Denmark 201109 5.33 
  200711 4.89 
  200502 4.48 
Estonia 201103 4.37 
  200703 4.67 
Finland 201104 5.12 
  200703 4.93 
France 200706 2.16 
Germany 200909 3.44 
  200509 2.8 
Great Britain 201005 2.47 
  200505 2.17 
Hungary 201004 1.66 
  200604 2.08 
Ireland 201102 3.01 
  200705 3.41 
Italy 200804 5.08 
  200604 5.18 
Luxembourg 200906 3.81 
  200406 4.34 
Netherlands 201006 5.54 
  200611 4.75 
Poland 200710 4.26 
  200509 3.6 
Portugal 201106 3.14 
  200909 2.54 
  200502 2.56 
Romania 200811 3.37 
Slovakia 201203 4 
  201006 4.81 
  200606 6.12 
 20 
Slovenia 201112 4.43 
  200809 4.9 
Spain 201111 2.35 
  200803 2.5 
  200403 2.48 
Sweden 201009 4.15 
  
200609 4.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
